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ABSTRACT
The literature on political business cycles (PBC) suggests that due to the myopic nature
of individual voters and their retrospective voting attitudes, governments can manipulate
the economy to create such conditions to increase their popularity to win elections.  The
theoretical model of this opportunistic PBC is based on Nordhaus theoretic (1975).
This study attempts to investigate the presence of politically manufactured monetary
cycles (PMC) in Turkey within the traditional Nordhausian opportunistic PBC model.
Initially, a descriptive statistical analysis with the data related to the monetary aggregates
is conducted for the period of 1986-2002 (monthly and annually) to search for the impact
of elections on such variables in terms of deviation from the mean values.  Thus,
deviations from and interruptions in the trend in the monetary policy instruments are
attributed to the political manipulations of these variables due to electioneering.  In
addition, the monetary policy instruments and outcomes are analysed in an econometric
analysis, in which they are modelled within interrupted time-series analysis with monthly
data for the 1986 M1-2002 M11 period. In order to produce the most efficient result of
the model as set in the research, the interrupted time-series model, which is a version of the
classical multiple regression model, is chosen as a good fit for analysing the impact of an
election on the behaviour of the monetary policy instruments and outcomes.
The results of the econometric time-series analysis provide strong evidence for the
existence of PMC or simply PBC in the case of Turkey, and hence supports the
Nordhausian theoretic.  The statistical analysis, however, renders certain degree of
support for the presence of PMC in Turkey.
The results implicate that incumbent governments in Turkey have used monetary policy
instruments and outcomes in creating PMC during election periods in their attempts to
buy votes for winning elections or to enhance their chances of re-election during the
period in question.
Keywords: Political business cycles, political monetary cycles, opportunistic business
cycles, Nordhaus model, elections, monetary policy, monetary instruments and
outcomes, time series analysis, Turkey.
JEL Classification: E32; E42; E52; E58; E63 
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“Whilst it cannot be denied that great economic progress has been
made, it is unfortunately the case that these principles have not been
strictly followed by Turkey’s policy makers … due to numerous
elections held in 1987… [N]umerous legitimate objectives … have
deliberately been sacrificed in order to meet the excessive public sector
spending on infrastructure projects and services such as
transportation, power, telecommunications, highways which had a
special significance for the country’s voters.”
 TUSIAD (1988: iii)
I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on political business cycles (PBC) suggests that incumbent governments
use monetary and fiscal policies to create opportunistic policy cycles for manipulating the
economy to win elections.  A particular attempt is the use of monetary policy
instruments, which results in the creation of politically manufactured monetary cycles
(PMC).  This can be either due to financing of the increased government expenditures
for election reasons or direct increase in money supply in the economy.  It should,
however, be noted that this is probably not a very straightforward policy in those
countries where a central bank has independence, which constrains the government’s
manipulation of monetary policy.
This study aims to explore the impact of elections on the behaviour of monetary
aggregates in Turkey.  Monetary policy instruments and outcomes can be influenced by
elections through the political manipulation of the economy as well as due to the need
for injecting money into the economy for expensive election campaigns.  Although
economic bureaucracy formulates monetary policy similar to fiscal policy, considering the
close political links between the bureaucrats and the government, it is reasonable to
assume that bureaucracy would not have any power to resist the requirements of the
government in Turkey.  Considering that in Turkey, the Governor of the Central Bank
and the Under-Secretary of the Treasury are directly appointed by the government and
that the Central Bank did not possess independence until later months of 2001, as it was
part of the government apparatus, the likelihood of political manipulation of the
monetary policies becomes more unambiguous. Unlike independent central banks,
Central Bank of Turkey operated in an opportunistic manner to help the incumbent
governments to remain in power, to which end it could use the monetary policy
instruments within its portfolio.  This provides the rationale to study the development
and trends in monetary policy and its instruments for political intervention for electoral
profiteering.
Although a general understanding of electoral economy is common among people in
Turkey, there is not any clear indication of the degree and the extent of the relationship
between elections and, for instance, money supply in the economy.  Analysis in this study
thus aims to examine and uncover the nature of these associations in a systematic
manner and attempts to substantiate the predictions and the results of the an earlier
study, where it was demonstrated that incumbent governments in Turkey were involved
in manufacturing opportunistic type of PBC in fiscal and monetary policies the post-1980
period in Turkey (Asutay, 2004).
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A close study on Turkish political economy would indicate that factors other than
unemployment and inflation play an important role in conditioning elections in Turkey,
such as political patronage and other socio-political factors.  It may therefore be difficult
to expect direct association between macroeconomic variables and the outcomes of
elections as precisely as expected from empirical analysis.  However, the personal
networks of the politicians and political patronage implies the use of money in particular
during election periods.  Thus, the dynamics of politically motivated business cycles
features different elements in the case of Turkey.
The political economy of Turkey implicitly demonstrates the overwhelming power of the
state over macroeconomic management and policy-making.  Thus, governments in
Turkey have used every opportunity to intervene in the economy.  However, as this study
discusses, the important issue is the motivation of government in their intervention.
This motivation can be, as it is most of the time, for political gains, as politicians aim to
remain in power at the expense of the political manipulation of economy.
It should be noted that political instability in Turkey does not help us to draw direct
conclusions with regards to the political manipulation of the economy.  In other words,
without sound empirical support it is not possible to reach any conclusions for the strong
motivation of governments to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes.  In
addition, the insensitivity of the electorate to economic issues in electoral politics in
Turkey as compared to European and American citizens contributes to the difficulty of
observing such systematic manipulation.
This study focuses on monetary policy oriented macroeconomic variables, which are
expected to be more vulnerable to political manipulation in Turkey, such as money
supply, inflation and government finance.  Hence, the behavioural changes in inflation
and monetary aggregates are analysed in an attempt to model a politico-economy
interaction through monetary policy.
It should also be noted that money increase in the economy during election periods can
be significantly affected by an election motivated demand for credit from the private
sector during the election period, though this is not the major research concern of this
study.  For instance, parties allocate and spend extremely large amounts of money for
their campaigns in their attempt to appeal to and attract the public.
II. ELECTIONS AND MONETARY POLICY: A LITERATURE SURVEY ON
POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES
The various variants of PBC, in particular the opportunistic models, assume that
governments increase their intervention in the economy through manipulations of fiscal
and monetary policies before elections to enhance their re-election chances.  The cycle is
completed in the post-election period, when governments attempt to pursue policies to
reduce inflation leading to increased unemployment.  The underlying assumption of
these models is the ‘myopic voters’, who are assumed to be concerned only with the
immediate past economic performance of a government, namely the assumption of
retrospective voter.
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2.1. Political Monetary Cycles: The Model and Assumptions
The opportunistic model of PBC predicts that the incumbent governments attempt to
launch expansionary or pro-growth policies prior to elections with the objective of
boosting consumption and to demonstrate the visible active nature of the economy.
This in turn is expected to boost the popularity of the incumbent government.  It should
be stated that governments have only two main policy instruments in their attempt to
manipulate the economy, namely fiscal and monetary policy.  These are employed
individually or together to increase the aggregate demand in the economy.  As a result, as
enunciated by Brownstone et al. (1980: 116), these macroeconomic policies serve not
only economic but also political objectives.  Thus, theoretical models of PBC can be
extended into monetary policy to examine the rise of politically manipulated monetary
cycles of PMCs as well.
Following the same logic as in PBC, in the case of PMC, as illustrated in figure 1, the
theoretical model suggests that if money supply increases before elections for non-
economic reasons such as politically motivated reasons, it is likely to decrease after the
election at a greater rate.  A decrease in money supply takes place due to the fact that
government attempts to offset the negative effects of pre-electoral monetary and fiscal
expansionary policies such as inflation, or simply because money increase is neutralised
as necessitated by the real economy.  However, when the next election (2) approaches,
the government again attempts to use fiscal and monetary policies to boost the economy
with an attempt to buy votes.
Figure 1. Creating the PMC
Figure 1 demonstrates that when the money supply increase in the economy due to the
incumbent government’s attempts to politically manipulate the economy during an
election period (1), this helps the economy to boost and creates jobs through expanding
aggregate demand.  The impact can be immediately observed in declining unemployment.
The increased money supply normally brings about inflation in the economy.  However,
as can be seen in figure 2, inflation increase shows itself in a lagged manner after the
election period as the theory predicates.  Thus, while the impact of politically-
manipulated monetary policies on unemployment can be detected or felt immediately,
such an impact takes time to affect inflation.
  Growth of M1
Growth of Inflation
Growth of Unemployment
Election 1 Election 2
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Figure 2 further illustrates the entire working mechanism of politically manipulated
monetary policy cycles.  As can be seen, the economy experiences a shock in the form of
expansionary fiscal policy and expansion in private sector credits through expansionary
monetary policy.  In other words, it depicts that pre-electoral money supply increase in
the economy due to the fact that the incumbent government intervenes to boost the
economy with the objective of increasing its own popularity. Figure 2. also depicts that
money supply increase in the economy can be due to the increase in demand for money
before the elections to finance expensive election campaigns.
Figure 2. Working Mechanism of PMC through Growth of M1
In the post-election period, as can be seen in figure 2, the economy goes through another
shock in the form of austere fiscal policies and monetary policies in the form of private
sector credits to contract the economy to offset the negative consequences of the
previous expansion.  The direct consequence of this is contraction in private sector
credits as well.  This process is repeated through the entire election period from one
election to another.
2.2. Empirical Studies on PMC: A Brief Survey
The literature evidences the existence of a number of studies investigating the existence
of politically-motivated monetary and fiscal policy cycles.  For instance, Frey and
Schneider (1981) provide an extensive literature review, which demonstrates the
abundance of empirical findings on politically motivated expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies before elections.
In addition, Havrilesky (1988) and Wagner (1980b) conclude that governments indeed
use their monopoly power over money to manipulate the economy for electoral gains or
profiteering.  Tufte (1978), Alesina (1989) and Rogoff (1990) provide further evidence
that governments increase their spending and reduce their collections to profit from
elections.
Expansionary
Fiscal Policy
Expansion
in Private
Sector
Credits
Austere
Fiscal Policy
Contraction in
Private Sector
Credits
Pre-Election Post-Election
  Election 1   Election 2
  Growth of M1
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There are a number of studies, which attempt to examine and question the existence of
PMC in industrialised democracies.  For example, Cargill and Hutchinson (1991)
examine interbank interest rates in Japan, and find that they decrease prior to elections,
which refers to the existence of expansionary monetary policy for the purpose of
electoral profiteering for the incumbent government.  In contrast, Kohno and Nishizawa
(1990) reason that monetary policy in Japan is hardly exploitable for political purposes,
because they hold that the Bank of Japan is independent of the influences of politicians,
as well as to the fact that the complex nature of monetary policy in Japan discourages
political manipulation.  By providing the same lines of conclusion, Li (1988) argues that
since presidents protect the central bank in Taiwan, it is immune to political
manipulation. However, Limmanee (1999) provides statistical evidence to demonstrate
the use of money supply for electoral purposes, as she reveals that incumbent
governments expand the monetary base prior to elections to boost their popularity.
Remmer (1993) studies the case for Latin America, and measures the growth rate of
money both before and after elections in efforts to analyse the impact of elections on
macroeconomic performance.  She concludes that money supply might expand rapidly
before elections.  This, she argues, is because; money supply is susceptible to the pre-
electoral economic manipulation of the governments.  Such expansion in the money base
is used to buy votes and finance political patronage and informal and personal networks.
As a result, money base can significantly increase through an election motivated demand
for credits from the private sector.  Therefore, Remmer (1993) measures the growth rate
of M1 in the pre and post election periods in estimating the influence of elections on
macroeconomic performance in Latin American countries.  She modelled her study on
the assumption that an increase in M1 before elections is associated with macroeconomic
expansion.  However, her results indicate that M1 tend to increase after, not prior, to
elections, in contrast to the assumption of the theory.
Rogoff (1990) extends the PBC model into the dominant party system, which resembles
the developing country case.  He suggests that even in such systems the incumbent
government would attempt to pursue expansionary fiscal and monetary policies prior to
elections.  This is because of the fact that in such dominant party systems, incumbent
parties attempt to maximise their margin of winning election, as this determines their
governing ability and capacity as well as affecting intra-party dissent.
To shed some light on the post-election behaviour of governments, it is useful to
examine the changes that take place and the behaviour of monetary policy after the
elections.  Nordhaus (1975) and Havrilesky (1988) found that more disciplined monetary
policy and stringent fiscal policies are applied during post-election periods to
counterbalance the impact of expansionary policies before the elections.  This implies
that if money supply is increased by electoral politics, its growth rate is likely to be
corrected in the post-election period.  It is difficult to categorically expect the ‘correction’
process, as ‘displacement effect’ can set in to prevent money growth rate correcting itself
to return to the pre-election trend.
Within the analysis of PMC, it is equally important to discuss the concept of
‘manufactured inflation’.  In other words, inflation can be a result of the electioneering
polices of the government in attempting to increase its popularity, as governments launch
expansionary aggregate demand policies (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987: 15).  Thus, the
political economy of inflation is another aspect of PBC and PMC, and Hirsch and
Goldthorpe (1978) and Peretz (1983) initiate a discussion and framework of research on
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the political foundations of inflation, which is an economic phenomenon.   Among
others, Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Happy (1989), Hibbing (1987), Hibbs (1985),
Madsen (1980) and Norpoth (1994) extend the analysis of PBC into inflation.  All these
studies found that inflation takes place prior to elections as governments attempt to
provide a more robust economy to cheat the voters.  In particular Remmer (1993) finds
that inflation is associated with governmental policy manipulation in Latin American
countries.
III. DESIGNING THE RESEARCH
This study investigates the possible association between elections and money supply.
Although it may sound simple, there exists no previous systematic research on the
subject matter in the case of Turkey.  Thus, examining the relationship between elections
and money supply could shed some new light on an important aspect of PBC, namely
PMC.
The objectives of this paper as regards to examining the existence of PMC can be
summarised as follow:
i. Do elections have any influence on money supply and inflation?
ii. If so, how does it take place?
iii. Why does or does not elections and economy relationship or causality take place?
In endeavouring to provide responses to these questions, the analysis in this section
commences with an investigation of the movements in the trend of monetary policy
instruments and outcomes before and after elections.  Therefore, it uses the electoral
economy approach rather than economic voting approach as its frame of reference, as
the later model assumes the relationship between economics and politics in a reverse
causal direction.  This approach requires analysis of changes in macroeconomic
performance before and after elections.  It is therefore in this model that economic
behaviour is explained by political events, in contrast to the economic voting approach
where political behaviour is explained by the use of economic factors.  This implies that
the study follows the postulate that economics does not exist in a realm of independent
of politics, as Tufte (1978: 137) argues that “[p]olitical life, then, is far more than an
occasional random shock to a self-contained isolated economic system, rather economic
life vibrates with the rhythms of politics”.
The econometric analysis in this research, first, attempts to demonstrate if there are
changes in the behaviour of money supply prior to election and after elections.  Due to
the nature of the inquiry, M1 is used as a measure of the money supply in the economy.
This is because M1 denotes the short-term money available immediately for spending.  If
hypothesis structure is used, then the following hypotheses are postulated to test the
case:
H1: Money supply, M1t, increases prior to elections;
H2: Money supply, M1t, decreases after elections.
The choice of M1 as the measure of money supply in relation to the election period can
easily be justified, as the growth of M1 directly correlates with growth in national
production (Brownstone et al., 1980: 181).  The implication of this is that if there is an
unexpected increase in M1 growth by a non-economic shock such as an election, a
following decrease in M1 growth rate is likely after the effects of the shock disappear.  As
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a result, the postulated hypotheses imply that election shocks lead to divergences, or
increase and decrease, in the normal trends of changes in M1 in Turkey.
In order to see if the impact of elections on M1, if any, is related to the government’s
expansionary policies or is just the result of costly election campaigns, two more
hypotheses are postulated.
H3: Money supply, M1t, is determined by government policy, GFt during the
election period;
H4: Money supply, M1t, is determined by fluctuations and cycles in the demand of
private sector, PCt, during the election period.
The research extends to see the developments in inflation rates in relation to electoral
manipulation of the economy, too. Due to only confining to domestic demand factors,
inflation, then, takes place in a lagged manner due to expansionary fiscal policies, which
lead to a rapid rise in the circulation of money in the economy.   It is therefore likely to
see that inflation occurs prior to an election or immediately after an election and then
persists for some time afterwards.  It is a fact that increased money supply does not
necessarily result in inflation absolutely.  For instance, monetary authorities can take the
necessary measures to prevent inflation through their intervention in the financial
markets.  Thus, to test the significance of changes in inflation prior to, during and post-
elections in Turkey, the following hypotheses are postulated:
H5: Inflation, It, increases prior to elections;
H6: Inflation, It, declines after elections.
If analysis in this section finds that inflation is affected by elections, then it is plausible to
examine the relationship between inflation and public finance and the credit of private
sector during election periods.  The underlying theoretical understanding is the fact that
during election time, the government increases money supply either directly or through
fiscal policies, which lead to increased private credit in the economy.  Thus, as can be
conceived there is a dynamic relationship between inflation and public and private
finance, which can be expressed in the following hypotheses:
H7: Inflation, It, is determined by government policy, Gt, during an election period;
H8: Inflation, It, is determined by changes in demand condition in the private
sector, Pt, during an election period.
In order to ensure the econometric precision, the time lag between the change in a
macroeconomic field and elections is clarified, and the signs and the degree of influence
are estimated through econometric testing.  The results of the study are utilised to
postulate an enhanced theoretical generalisation on the relationship between elections
and monetary behaviour in Turkey.
IV. MODELLING PMC: ECONOMETRIC FEATURES
The research related to the political economy of elections within public choice or new
political economics attempts to model the relationship between macroeconomic variables
and elections, whereby aims to examine the impact of politics on economy.  Thus, in
order to measure the impact of pre-election economic performance of the government
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on the election outcome, the model examining the relationship is formulated in the
following function:
Votes for the incumbent = ƒ (macroeconomic conditions)
The function depicts that macroeconomic conditions such as income, inflation and
unemployment are exogenous variables.  However, the percentage of votes obtained by
the incumbent government is treated as an endogenous variable.  Among the many
variants of this version of PBC modelling, Kramer (1971), Happy (1986) and Hibbing
(1987) provide some of the examples.
The second version of PBC, on the other hand, focuses on the reversed causality set out
in the model mentioned above.  Thus, the relationship is expressed as:
Behaviour of Macroeconomic Variables = ƒ (election time)
In this version of PBC modelling, elections and time are independent variables, and
trends in the development in one of the macroeconomic variables constitute the
dependent variable.  In this second version, which constitutes the research framework
for this research, the essential concern is the change taking place in macroeconomic
variables prior to and post-elections.
So as to see the development in the modelling of PBC, two pioneering models are
presented before delving into the particularities of the model:
Lewis-Beck (1986: 212-220) forms his model aiming to quantify the impact of elections
on macro-economy as:
  
€ 
Yt = b0 + b1X1t + b2X2t + b3X3t + b4X4t + b5X5t + et (1)
where
Yt equals n time-series observations of the exogenous variable or dependent variable;
X1t stands for a dummy variable counter for time from 1 to n;
X2t is a dichotomous dummy variable, which is assigned 0 for observations before the
first intervention and 1 for observations after that intervention;
X3t denotes a dummy variable which is equal to 0 for observations before the first
intervention and 1, 2, …, for observations after;
X4t and X5t acts in the same way for the second intervention as X2t and X3t do for the
first intervention; and
et stands for the error term.
It should be noted that X2t aims to measure the post-intervention change in intercept,
and X3t is instated to measure the post-intervention change in slope.
Remmer’s (1993) model, on the other hand, is particularly applied in developing country
cases as mentioned above, which aims to measure the performance of macroeconomic
variables in pre- and post-election periods as well.  It should be stated that Remmer’s
model is the modified version of Lewis-Beck’s model, which is briefly described above.
Her modifications include the addition of three more dummy variables to capture the
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state of the economy in one quarter prior to an election (X2t), the quarter in which the
election takes place (X3t) and lastly the quarter after the elections (X4t).  In the model,
interventions or elections can be modelled to be more than one.  Remmer’s model (1993:
396) is expressed in equation 2:
  Yt = b0 + b1X1t + b2X2 t + b3X 3t + b4X 4t +b5X5t + b6X6 t + et  (2)
where
Yt and X1t are described in much the same way as in equation 1.
X5t and X6t are defined in the same way as X2t and X3t in equation 1 respectively.
To enable the model to include more than one intervention, for instance in the case of
adding one more election, two new dummy variables are added, which enables the model
to capture post-electoral changes in intercept and slope.
It should be emphasised that research in this paper follows the model put forward by
Remmer (1993).  However, the model is modified to reflect the general aim of the
research.  Therefore, from Remmer’s model (equation 2), individual election terms for
measuring post election intercept shift (X5t) and slope (X6t) are omitted.  These dummy
variables aim to capture the impact of individual elections of economy.  The objective of
this research, however, is to find the general pattern of monetary behaviour during pre-
and post-election periods.  This provides justification for the modification of the model.
This research amends the model in such a way as to avoid any arbitrary restrictions on
modelling.  As in Remmer’s (1993) study, many other studies in the literature assume that
economic changes occur during pre- and post-electoral periods.  But, these changes,
then, disappear about one quarter before and after elections. Among the many studies,
which are modelled around such an assumption Erikson (1989), Hibbs (1985),
Kirchgassner (1985a, 1985b and 1986), Mosley (1978), Norpoth (1994), Owens and
Wade (1988), Prysby and Books (1994), Warwick (1992) and Williams (1990) may be
mentioned.  However, it is not plausible to assume that the electoral economy exhibits
the same type of cycles regardless of variations of electoral and campaign systems across
different countries.  Therefore, the model presented in equation 3 aims to avoid an
arbitrary manipulation of the model
  
€ 
Yt = b0 + Σ
i=1
4
bt Xit + et   (3)
where
Yt denotes the n time series observations on macroeconomic variables, i.e. money supply
(∆lnM1t) and inflation (∆It), which are measured in first difference form;
X1t is a dummy variable for measuring a time trend of money supply (1, 2, …, n);
X2t is a dichotomous dummy variable, which represents the month(s) immediately
preceding elections;
X3t stands for a dichotomous dummy variable representing the month in which elections
occur;
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X4t is a dichotomous dummy variable which represents the month(s) immediately
following elections; and lastly
et is the usual error term.
The regression coefficients in the model represent the following terms:
b0 estimates the intercept term;
b1 estimates the time trend of Yt;
b2 estimates the pre-electoral change in Yt;
b3 estimates the change in Yt in the month of election, and lastly
b4 estimates the post-electoral change in Yt.
It should be established that among these regression coefficients, b2 and b4 exist to test
hypotheses H1 and H2, and H5 and H6, as b2 estimates pre-electoral macroeconomic
changes whilst b4 as a coefficient stands for post-election macroeconomic changes.  It
should be noted that if pre-electoral and post-electoral macroeconomic changes are
present, it is important to find out when they commence and disappear.  This is
determined by the coefficient b3.
In addition, the following model in equation 4 is formulated for testing hypotheses H3
and H4, and H7 and H8:
  
€ 
DYt = c0 + c1DGt + c2DPt + et (4)
where
DYt is n time-series observations on a macroeconomic variable such as money supply
(∆lnM1t) and inflation (∆It), which are measured in first difference form during election
periods (D),
DGt denotes the n time series observations on government finance (∆lnGt), which is
measured in first difference form during election periods (D),
DPt stands for n time series observations on private credit growth (∆lnPt), which is
measured in first difference form during election periods (D), and lastly
et is the usual error term.
In the equation or the model 4., the coefficients estimate the following terms:
c0 denotes the coefficient of the intercept term,
c1 stands for the coefficient estimating the impact of government finance on a
macroeconomic variable, such as money supply and inflation during election periods (D),
and
c2 is the coefficient estimating the effect of private money on a macroeconomic variable
such as money supply and inflation during election periods (D).
V. DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF VARIABLES
As the above postulated hypotheses indicate, money supply, inflation, government
finance and the credit of the private sector constitute the time-series econometric analysis
in this research.  So as to capture the impact of elections, three dummy variables are
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introduced: dummy variables for the pre-election months, dummy variables for the
month in which the elections took place, and lastly dummy variables for the post-election
months.
5.1. Money Supply
Money supply consists of various definitions, and includes a broader range of money
terms.  For instance, M1 represents narrow transaction money, such as currency, demand
deposits, and checkable deposits (Shim and Siegel, 1995: 236).
In defining which money definitions are to be used, it is important to consider that
elections are likely to invite short-term money demand instead of medium or long-term
money demand. In the case of Turkey, political parties, which are represented in the
parliament, receive direct funding from the budget according to the number of deputies
they have.  It is unambiguous to predict that these funds are directly injected into the
market through campaign spending.  In addition, each individual prospective candidate in
the selection process of the political party has to pay a handsome amount of application
fee to the party for which he/she might run in the election as a candidate.  Considering
that Turkish parliament seats 550 deputies, and considering that there are over ten
political parties contest election through out the country and therefore considering the
number of people who would like to be selected to run in the election render a general
indication of how much money is injected into economy before each election only
through selection process.  Furthermore, political parties do also raise general funds.
Such privately-donated funds are injected into the economy during the election process.
Moreover, expensive, large and popularised election campaigns result in the injection of
enormous monies in the economy. These are all in addition to the use of money supply
by the incumbent government for electioneering purpose, such as the use of public funds
for patronage and other kind of electioneering reasons.  Consequently, a large increase in
the monetary base is expected during each election period.
Ito (1989) employs M1 plus Certificates of Deposits (CD) to examine medium-term
monetary policy of the Central Bank of Japan in relation to electoral cycles.  However,
taking into account the impact of election campaigns on money supply in the economy, it
might be more plausible to estimate the constructed hypotheses with M1.  This is a valid
assertion in the case of Turkey as well, as elections are likely to invite short-term money
demand rather than medium or long-term demand.  The use of M1 in this case is
vindicated by Özatay (1999), who states that the Central Bank of Turkey (CBTR) directly
controls M1 and monetary base.  Thus, M1 can be utilised together with money base and
domestic credits provided by CBTR to investigate the existence of PMC in Turkey.
  
€ 
M1t = ln(M1t − M1t )×100   (5)
Logarithmic form and functional transformation expressed in equation 5 is used for M1
to differentiate the value of M1 by the order of one to ensure the econometric stationary
process generating time series variables.  After checking the stationary nature of the
variable, values of M1 is multiplied by 100 to represent it in terms of growth rates or
percentage.
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5.2. Inflation
While inflation is expressed as a general increase in the price level, various measures can
be utilised to measure it, such as CPI (consumer price index) and WPI (wholesale price
index).  While the latter is based on producer prices, the former measures the average
level of prices of goods and services bought by an ordinary urban family, and hence is
based on market prices.  Although it might be expected that CPI may overstate the level
of inflation due to the state of retail market and the profit mark-up, it is the CPI that the
ordinary people are related, and thus, concerned with.  Since this study attempts to
investigate how monetary and fiscal policies are manipulated and hence have an impact
on population, it is expected that CPI should be a better measure for such an objective.
As in the case of M1, inflation, I, is differentiated for stationary process generating time
series variables, which is illustrated in equation 6:
  
€ 
It = (It−1 − It ) (6)
A particular case for Turkey needs to be stressed: unemployment, despite its enormity, is
not a major concern in the elections other than in the general discourse of the politicians
to create jobs.  Price increases, however, is a general discussion matter for the ordinary
voters.  In particular when the state owned enterprises continue to supply the main
commodities in the economy, as consumption goods and input, the impact of price
increases can influence election results.  Despite the necessity for increasing prices of the
state economic enterprise (SEE) produced and distributed commodities, including oil
and electricity, governments prefer to suppress prices and defer price increases.
Therefore, in contrast to the theory, it is expected that during election years or months
inflation should be low to allow the incumbent government to utilise it for electoral
profiteering.  In other words, the popularity of governments is determined by lower price
increases in the economy in Turkey, which may be in conflict with increased government
spending.  However, the issue is not no-price increase but rather non-excessive increases,
which can be tolerated by the public.  On the other hand, the theory suggests that
inflation occurs in lags.  Therefore, it is expected that increased government spending to
enhance political popularity through the creation of opportunistic cycles in the election
months causes inflation in the later month.
5.3. Government Finance
Government finance is chosen to represent the government policy variable, despite the
fact that government policies for economic manipulation pre- and post-elections are
composed of both fiscal and monetary policies.  For choosing government finance, a
number of issues are considered.  Firstly, as Brownstone et al. (1980: 181) state, monetary
policy is not a single policy field, but instead is a set of money-related policies from the
central bank’s open market operations to management of discount rates, and from
regulative policies on the availability of credits to the requirements of reserve control.
Utilising monetary policy to determine government policy with regards to elections is,
therefore, a difficult task.  In addition, considering that money targets in the economy are
set in most cases one quarter in advance of actual policy implementation, it becomes
extremely difficult for the incumbent government to use it to boost the economy prior to
the election.  This is particularly difficult in the case of endogenously determined election
dates.   This is substantiated by Kohno and Nishizawa (1990: 158) in the case of Japan,
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when they argue that “[t]he prime minister does not know how long will it take for
monetary measures to have an impact.  When the election is triggered by some factors
that are out of prime minister’s control, it is probably too late to use monetary policy.
Even if the election date is set well in advance, the timing of such decision remains
difficult – and consequently the uncertainty becomes a substantial obstacle for the
political manipulation of the economy for electoral purposes”.
Against the difficulties posed by monetary policy, fiscal policy is comparatively easy to
observe.  In addition, the time lag of fiscal policy is short enough to impact on the
election outcomes, and therefore that fiscal policy is more likely to be subject to political
manipulation than the other macroeconomic policies (Kohno and Nishizawa, 1990: 158-
159).  In any case, as Swank (1988) rightly argues, the self-interest of policy-makers is
clearly one of the factors that shape the behaviour of governmental expenditure.
With regards to the definitions of fiscal policy in this context, it is taken as the difference
in government finances, which, in turn, is defined as “the difference between revenue,
and if applicable, grants received on the one hand and expenditure and lending minus
repayments on the other” (IMF, 1996: xxii).  This implies that in the context of this
study, government finance denotes the state of budget as budget surplus or deficit, which
is expressed in equation 7 in the form of a natural log difference in the percentage
growth rate.
  
€ 
Gt = ln(Gt−1 −Gt )×100  (7)
5.4. Private Demand
Being the fourth variable in the model, private money demand in the economy during
election periods, such as for financing campaign expenses is measured by the total credit
of the private sector in a country.  According to the IMF definition, the government
sector and the public enterprise sector form the remaining part of the domestic credit
(IMF, 1996: xvii).  Private money, Pt, represents the aggregate credit of a social sector
thereby it can obtain its own categorical identity from the endogenous variable, namely
M1.  Being the main variable in the model, M1 denotes money with a high “level of
liquidity” (Mishkin, 1995: 60).
It should be noted that fund raising for election campaigns in Turkey is not run as
professional as it is in the industrialised Western countries, as politics, as a concept, and
political parties, as institutions, have not been able to establish the tradition of being
institutional.  Therefore, fund raising ways are indeed multidimensional, as for electoral
campaigns parties draw funds from government in terms of fund provision according to
the number of deputies that each party has in the parliament.  Tacit donations from
industry including public sector enterprises are another method of financing.  In the
developments of private demand, as mentioned above, the applications fee of those
potential candidates who like to be selected by a particular party to run in the election has
to be considered as well.
However, whatever the source of campaign financing, the effect of increasing money
supply in the economy would be the same: they are expected to cause an increase in the
aggregate credit of the private sector.  Therefore, the model in this research adopts total
domestic credit claimed by the private sector as an auxiliary indicator for election
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motivated demand, such as campaign finance demands of private sector.  It is formulated
as in equation 8:
  
€ 
Pt = ln(Pt−1 − Pt )×100  (8)
The expression in equation 8 implies that the private credit variable, Pt, is expressed as a
log-difference in percentage growth format.
VI. DEFINING THE MODEL AND THE TIME-SERIES SPECIFICATIONS
After presenting the model(s), the following section discusses other particularities of the
model by first determining the expected signs of each variable used in the model.
6.1. Defining Expected Signs of Parameters
After formulating the model, the expected signs of parameters or variables are defined,
and depicted in table 1.
Table 1. The Expected Signs of Variables in the Model
Variable Label Expected Sign
Time Trend b1 (+) (-)
a
Money Supply
Months Prior to Election b2 +
Post Election Months b4 -
Public Finance c1 -
Private Credit c2 +
Inflation
Months Prior to Election b2 +
Post Election Months b4 (+) then (-)
b
Public Finance c1 -
Private Credit c2 +
Notes: a. Determined by the trend; b. The precise trend is determined by lag effect
The money supply is expected to have a positive sign in the pre-election period and a
negative sign in post-election period.  This is because M1 is expected to grow above its
normal trend before an election period, and due to contractionary polices the M1 base
declines in the post-election period to combat inflation in the economy, which is a result
of the expansionary monetary or fiscal policy in the pre-election period.  Thus, the
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coefficient of the immediate post-electoral money supply, namely b4, is expected to hold
a negative sign.
Since election month is not covered by this study, its coefficient sign (b3) is ignored as it
can hardly be predicted.  This study aims to distinguish pre- and post-election changes in
monetary developments.  It should be added however, that this does not imply ruling out
the particular pattern in monetary variables during the election month.
The pattern followed by private credit and public finance also plays an important role in
the model.  Since, as explained above, the money supply (M1) is predicted to increase at a
quicker pace prior to an election and then retreat after the election, as in the case of PBC
where expansionary fiscal policies adapted by governments prior to election and
contractionary or austere fiscal policies to control the development in the public finances
after election.  Accordingly, PMC models formulate that there will be an increase in
private credit before elections and a decline after the election.  As a result, the sign of the
coefficient of the public finance is expected to be negative (c1), and by the same token
the coefficient of the private finance (c2) is also expected to be negative.
With regards to inflation, model assumes that it is not expected to decline before the
election.  It should be taken into account that inflation follows a time-lag pattern, and
therefore election stimulated inflation will come out only according to the lag structure.
Nevertheless, the PMC models assume that inflation should not decrease prior to
elections.  If this is the case and the sign of inflation coefficient (b2) is negative, this can
be interpreted to mean little to no correlation between inflation and elections.  Due to
the logic of the model and the real world experience, inflation is normally expected to
increase prior to an election due to the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to
create PBC and PMC respectively.  As the models predict, M1 is expected to follow an
expansionary path together with expansionary fiscal policies.  Therefore, in the model,
inflation prior to an election (b2) will have a positive sign, while after an election (b4) it is
expected to have a positive sign first and then a negative sign due to the lagged structure.
Since the pattern of fiscal policy and monetary policy both determine the trend in
inflation, when inflation is the dependent variable, the coefficients of public finance (c1)
are expected to have a negative and private credit (c2) to produce a positive sign.
It should be noted that, in the case of Turkey, as explained previously, an amendment
has to be made as regards to inflation, as voter sensitivity is very high for inflation, and
therefore governments attempt to delay the inflationary process during election periods.
Consequently, the sign for inflation, according to this amendment, would be positive
indicating increase before the election and vice versa.
6.2. Model Specification
In order to produce the most efficient result of the model as set in this study, the
interrupted time-series model, which is a version of the classical multiple regression model, is
chosen as a good fit for analysing the impact of an election on the behaviour of the
depended variable over the period for which analysis is carried out.
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As identified above, there are four times-series variables in the model: money supply,
inflation, public finance (surplus or deficit) and private sector credit.  The model further
incorporates three dummy variables representing pre-electoral months, the election
month, and the post-electoral months.
It should be mentioned in passing that in model 3, it is noted that if pre-electoral and
post-electoral macroeconomic changes are present, it is important to find out when they
commence and disappear, which is defined by the coefficient b3.  Since the election
campaign is limited to three months by the Constitution of Turkey, this can be taken as a
benchmark to find the electoral surfing of the economy.  In addition, since the
incumbent government can call an early election at its discretion, another three months
are assigned to capture the electoral impact before the election called or for capturing the
discretionary knowledge.  Thus, twelve models are constructed by combining from one
to six months each pre- and post-election period.  However, so as to choose the best-fit
model among these to represent the aim of this study, the model with the highest
coefficient of determination or goodness of fit statistics (R2) is chosen.
Using the usual OLS (Ordinary Least Square) method, this study tests all the formulated
models.  However, in the case of the absence of white noise disturbance term in a time
series variable, its ARMA (AutoRegressive Moving Averages) structure is integrated into
the equation.  This is due to the fact that incorporating the MA (Moving Averages) terms
into equations helps to enhance the predictable power of the model.  It should be noted
that when new independent variables are added to the equation, AR (AutoRegresive)
terms usually change.  This implies that adding new dummy variables to capture the
electoral impact could change the serial correlation of error term according to the model
chosen.  Therefore, in the case of necessity, AR terms are adjusted for its correction, and
maximum likelihood method will be used to estimate the parameters.  It should be stated
that the presence of serial correlation does not affect the unbiassedness or consistency of
regression estimators, but affects efficiency.  In other words, parameter estimates look
more precise than they actually are.
In the case of identified presence of heteroscedasticity, generalised autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity term is incorporated into models. The failure of
homoscedasticity in time-series analysis “may be complex and of the form of an ARCH
or GARCH process”(Darnell, 1994: 169). While ARCH refers to AutoRegressive
Conditional Heteroscedastic model, GARCH is the generalised version of ARCH.
Therefore, in the case of heteroscedasticity, GARCH terms are used. The variance of the
error terms should be homoscedastic to have efficient estimates.
The GARCH variance model with autoregressive errors, as defined by Pesaran and
Pesaran (1997: 96) is;
  
€ 
yt = ′ β xt + ut (9)
where ut is expressed as
  
€ 
V (ut Ωt−1 ) = ht
2 =α0 + αi
i=1
q
∑ ut−i
2 + Φi
i=1
p
∑ ht−i
2 + ′ δ wt  (10)
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where   
€ 
ht
2 is the conditional variance of ut with respect to the information set Ωt-1, and wt
is a vector of predetermined variables assumed to influence the conditional error
variances in addition to the past squared errors.  Thus, GARCH(p,q) is a special case of
(10) where 
€ 
δ=0.  As a result, the conditional variance is generated by an autoregressive
moving average process with ‘p’ autoregressive (AR) terms (
  
€ 
Φi
i=1
p
∑ ht−i
2 ) and ‘q’ moving
average (MA) terms (
  
€ 
αi
i=1
q
∑ ut−i
2 ), and is described as an GARCH(p,q) (Pesaran and Pesaran,
1997; Darnell, 1994).
The model of dependent time-series variables is employed for M1 and inflation, which
are identified by using the AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA)
procedure.  It is then incorporated into building regression equations.  An ARIMA (p,d,q)
model includes autoregressive process (AR), the integrated process (I), and the moving
average process (MA) (Yaffee, 2000: 108).  A simple ARMA process is a univariate
model, which seeks to model a single variable (Darnell, 1994: 9).  ARMA model is
represented by two parameters, ‘p’ and ‘q’.  While ‘p’ stands for the order of the
autoregressive component, ‘q’ denotes the order of the moving average component.  By
following Darnell (1994), if yt is described by an ARMA(p,q) process, then yt is modelled
as a stationary process as in equation 11:
  
€ 
yt = µ +α1 yt−1 +α2 yt−2 + ...+α p yt− p + εt + β1εt−1 + β2εt−2 + ...+ βqεt−q (11)
The ‘p’ terms in lagged ‘y’ comprise the autoregressive component, and the ‘q’ terms in
the innovations   
€ 
εt  are consisted of the moving average component.
ARMA models are applied to time series possibly after differencing the series to remove
trends.  “Time series whose dth differences have a stationary, invertible ARMA (p,q)
representation are called integrated process of order ‘d’, or I(d)” (Davidson, 2000: 95).
Then the process is represented as:
  
€ 
α(L )Δd yt = µ + θ(L )εt  (12)
which is known as ARIMA model of ‘y’, and is denoted as ARIMA (p,d,q).  In this
process, ‘p’ is the order of autoregressive component, ‘d’ is the order of integration and
‘q’ is the order of the moving average component.  By following Darnell (1994), if yt is an
ARIMA (p,d,q) process, then
  
€ 
Δd yt = µ +α1Δ
d yt−1 +α2Δ
d yt−2 + ...+α pΔ
d y y− p + εt + β1εt−1+β 2εt−2 + ...+ βqεt−q  (13)
where the first ‘p’ terms in   
€ 
Δd yt−i  comprise the autoregressive components of   
€ 
Δd yt ,   ε t
is a white noise-random variable, and the ‘q’ terms in   
€ 
εt− j  comprise the ‘q’ moving
average components.
6.3. Empirical Strategy: Time Series Characteristics
The data were analysed for their econometrics time-series features. The data for the study
displays a strong seasonal factor and therefore for all time-series variables the raw data
are seasonally adjusted for removing seasonal components.
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Each of the variables is expressed in the natural logarithmic form and differentiated by
the order one to ensure the stationary stochastic process generating time series
observations. To check the stationary characteristic of the data, the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test was utilised, which yielded that the first-order differentiation generates
stationary time-series for the variables included in this study.
The diagnostic tests were utilised to analyse the data further for econometrics time-series,
for instance to test the disturbance term, if it shows white noise.  White noise stochastic
disturbance term indicate that variations in the disturbance term are purely random and
do not contain any systemic elements.  In the case of monetary variable, M1, disturbance
term did not reveal any white noise and the ARMA (3,3) benchmark autoregressive
model selected by checking the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and SBC (Schwarz
Bayesian Criterion).
In the case of inflation, It, since inflation is expressed in index form, it constitutes the
growth rate of the inflation.  This clearly implies first-order difference, and hence the
coefficient of the inflation regression can be directly interpreted as the percentage
growth.  The unit root ADF test was performed and the results demonstrate that CPI, or
‘I’ is stationary.  The diagnostic test further provided information for selecting the
autoregressive model, and it was found that inflation has an ARMA(1,1).
With regards to government finance, budget surplus/deficit used as an approximation,
and the data was de-trended and seasonally-adjusted.  First, deterministic polynomial
trends were removed for de-trending after the data (Ender, 1995), like other variables,
were transformed into natural logarithmic.  The de-trended data then were seasonally-
adjusted by following Gujarati (2003).  The ADF test confirmed the stationarity of the
government finance indicator by first-differentiation.  The data for private demand were
treated in the same manner by econometrics process to establish stationarity.
The selected ARMA structures of macroeconomic time series variables together with
electoral variables were incorporated into regression equation. It should be added that in
the selection of the best model after the goodness of fit tests, the model selection is
based on the highest R2.
6.4. The Data
The choice of data period or frequency can influence the outcome of the study.  Annual
data for instance cannot be as sensitive as quarterly or monthly data in capturing the
impacts of interventions.
This study utilises monthly data in econometric time-series analysis.  As the literature
survey evidences, most of the studies on PBC used quarterly data in their attempt to
quantify PBC.  By taking into account that voters are assumed to have very short
memories (Wagner, 1980: 208), monthly even weekly data may provide much more
efficient performance in the analysis.  In particular, by recalling the analysis of inflation
within opportunistic PBC in Asutay (2004), the importance of monthly data may be
better understood.  Because in the case of inflation, only the election variables standing
for the election quarter was found to be significant.  Sensitivity of the voters towards
inflation and the myopic assumption was thus accounted for.  Hence, monthly data can
be more desirable than longer-term data, as voters are more sensitive to more recent
changes, and therefore, quarterly data on some occasions might debase the performance
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and accuracy of the modelling.  To illustrate the importance of using monthly data,
Lewis-Beck (1980) can be mentioned among others.  He found that in France, the
popularity of both the prime minister and president is influenced by inflation and
unemployment by a two-month lag.
By taking into account the merits of shorter-term data, this study uses monthly data. The
monthly data is limited to the January 1986 to November 2002 period.  Thus, this is a
time-series modelling for the January 1986-November 2002 period, which includes the
November 1987, October 1991, December 1995, April 1999 elections and the pre-
election period of November 2002 elections.
VII. SEARCHING FOR PMC IN TURKEY: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, data related to the monetary aggregates is analysed, monthly and annually,
to find the impact of election years and the election months respectively on the growth
rate of particular monetary policy instruments and outcomes.  As theory predicts, it is
expected that monetary policy instruments should increase in the election year or months
to boost the economy and decrease after the election to pave the way for policies aimed
at contracting the economy.
In descriptively investigating the particular variable for the existence of PMC, first the
descriptive statistics of the data are presented and then each variable is illustrated in a
graph for visual expression for inference.  As the theoretical section discusses, statistical
analysis aims to establish deviations from the mean values of each of the variable, and
deviations, if any, from the trend (as measured by the mean value) is attributed to
elections in the sense of interruption of the trend or the intervention of political
manipulation.
7.1. Money in Circulation:
Deconstructing the data for money in circulation in terms of annual growth rate of money
circulation depicts that it might have been used for opportunistic electoral purposes in
1987, 1999 and 2002 elections.  The descriptive statistics are provided in table 2.
Table 2. Annual Real Growth Rate of Money in Circulation in Election Years
Election
Years
Mean Growth:
Pre-Election
Years
One year
before the
Election
Growth in
Election
Year
One Year
after the
Election
1987 0.70 0.548
1991 0.736 0.66 0.533 0.741
1995 0.807 0.981 0.851 0.683
1999 0.776 0.731 0.783 0.694
2002 0.545 0.395 0.633
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The statistics demonstrate that, except the 1999 and 2002 elections, the growth rate of
money in circulation in the election year has been lesser than the pre-election year.  The
election year growth of money in circulation in the 1987 election year is also rather high.
It is also important to note that, except for the 1991 election year, table 2 demonstrates
that the growth of money in the election year is higher than the mean value of money
growth in the non-election years.  As opportunistic cycles theory indicates, the data
depicts that money growth declined in the following years of 1987, 1995, and 1999
elections.  Thus, descriptive statistics provide support for the use of money supply in
terms of money in circulation in the case of the 1987, 1999 and 2002 elections.  This is
illustrated in figure 3, which depicts that the 1987, 1999 and 2002 elections coincided
with the peaked real money growth rates in their period.  At the same time, as illustrated,
real money growth rates declined after the 1987, 1995 and 1999 elections.  It should be
stated, however, that the 1995 election does not provide support for opportunistic cycles,
as the behaviour of the real growth rate of money during the election year and the
previous year do not indicate any such cycles.
Figure 3. Annual Real Growth Rates of Money in Circulation
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In order to give further meaning to the analysis, monthly data for money in circulation is
analysed and deconstructed.  The real indices demonstrated in table 3 for money in
circulation indicate that the index declines in the election month for the 1987 and 1999
elections, whereas in the case of the 1991, 1995 and 2002 elections, election months
experienced remarkable increases in the index of real money in circulation.
In the 1999 elections, all the three pre-election months experienced remarkable increases
in the real index of money in circulation from one month to another.  The index declined
in comparison to the election month in the three post-election months.  Thus, the 1999
election demonstrate opportunistic cycles in the money supply in the economy for
electoral profiteering.
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Table 3. Monthly Real Index for Money in Circulation in Election Periods
Elections
1987
Nov.
1991
Oct.
1995
Dec.
1999
Apr.
2002
Nov.
3 Months Prior to Elections -43.59 -206.2 2566.1 2841.4 122019
2 Months Prior to Elections -14.43 602.46 -1467.2 19981.9 -24388
1 Month Prior to Elections 124.95 -21.73 -1130.3 148524.6 37387
Election Month -34.89 259.59 3082.52 -132489 282803
1 Month After Elections -100.7 -75.02 -3362.4 3252.89
2 Months After Election 86.05 -125.17 8534.4 10991.3
3 Months After Elections -27.33 170.22 8.89 41835.2
The results depicted in table 3 for the 1987 and 2002 elections imply that the index for
money in circulation increased in the pre-election month in comparison to the previous
month.  For the 1991 elections, it demonstrated huge increases in the two-months prior
to the election.  In the case of the 1995 and 2002 elections, the indices for the three-
months prior to the election are higher than the following months indices towards
elections.
With regards to post-election behaviour, the index for money in circulation decreased for
the 1987, 1991 and 1995 elections in the post-election month after elections, but
increased for the 1987, 1995 and 1999 elections in the post-election two-months after the
elections.
The case for the 1999 election is further examined with monthly data by estimating the
monthly growth rate, which is depicted in figure 4.  While it shows decline in the
monthly growth rate of money in circulation in the election month, remarkable increases
in the growth rate are obvious in both and two months prior to the election.  The figure
further illustrates the decline in the growth rate in money in circulation in the post-
election month, and then the increase.  However, the increase in growth rate in the
second and third month after the election still remains less than the pre-election period
increase in growth.
Analysis so far implies support to various degrees, but there is reasonable support for the
monetary political cycles in 1987, 1999 and 2002 elections.  However, in the case of the
1999 elections, it is obvious that the opportunistic cycle predictions are held.  It should
be noted that statistical analysis of the monetary variables included for monetary
measures such as ‘M1’, ‘M2’, ‘M2Y’ and ‘M3’.  However, none of these seem to render
direct and overall support for opportunistic business cycles.  Instead, as in the case of
money in circulation, there is particular support for particular elections, which renders
direct support for the opportunistic cycles model in the case of 1999 elections.
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Figure 4. Monthly Real Growth Rates of Money in Circulation during 1999
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Note: Red colour marked point stands for election month, and yellow colour is for pre-and post
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7.2. Domestic Credits:
Domestic credits are another source of opportunistic cycle behaviour for the incumbent
government to steer the election to increase its popularity to win the elections.  As part
of the Central Bank portfolio, domestic credits are extended to all public sector agencies
by the Central Bank, and very often such agencies refer to the credits to overcome their
short-run funding needs.  This means that domestic credits are vulnerable to use for
electoral purposes.  Therefore, the annual growth rate of domestic credits is estimated
and the summary statistics are presented in table 4.
Table 4. The Annual Real Growth Rate of Domestic Credits in Election Years
Election
Years
Average
Growth -
Years before
the Election
One year
before the
Election
Growth in
Election
Year
One Year
after the
Election
1987 0.55 0.48
1991 0.486 0.518 0.67 0.76
1995 0.86 1.037 0.955 1.32
1999 1.11 0.92 0.80 0.68
2002 0.857 1.031 0.219
Table 4 depicts that only in the 1987 and 1991 election years was the real growth of
domestic credits higher than the previous year, and only in the case of the 1999 election
was the one-year post-election real growth of domestic credit lower than the election year
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as the theory predicts.  It should also be noted that only the growth rate of real domestic
credit in the election year is the non-election years mean in the case of the 1991 and 1995
elections.
Figure 5. Annual Real Growth Rate of Domestic Credits
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This trend in the growth rate of the domestic credit is demonstrated in figure 5, which
depicts that only in the case of the 1987 and 1991 elections did the peak growth rate
coincided with the election year.  The 1995 elections demonstrate a rough proximity to
the peak point of the growth rate of domestic credits.  However, the declining trend in
the real growth of annual domestic credits is obvious in the last two elections, which can
be explained by the stringent IMF-controlled austerity policies.  The sharp increases in
the growth rates in the post-elections can be attributed to the short-run financial needs of
the public sector to overcome the huge spending commitments for populist reasons
during the election year.  Gradual increases in the growth rate from 1989 to 1993 should
be attributed to other political events such as local elections and general referendums.
Table 5. Mean Real Growth Rate of Domestic Credits in Election Periods
Mean Value of Annual Growth of
Non-Interest Government
Expenditures
Election Year 0.637
Non-Election Year 1 0.813
Non-Election Year 2 0.843
Non-Election Year 3 0.826
Non-Election Year Mean 0.827
Annual Overall Mean 0.768
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Table 5 furthers the analysis by examining the mean value of the annual growth rates of
domestic credits. The results do not provide any further support for the opportunistic
cycles in domestic growth.  Election years mean value remains lower than any other
mean value.
To find the monthly developments in the real growth rate of the domestic credits in
relation to elections, the monthly data were further broken down and the statistical
summary is depicted in table 6, which demonstrates that in the case of the 1987 elections
domestic credits increased enormously (16.15 times) in the two months prior to the
elections.  While there was a decline in the growth rate of domestic credits one month
prior to elections, the growth rate was 1.14 one month-after the election.
Table 6. Monthly Real Growth Rate of Domestic Credits in Election Periods
Elections
1987
Nov.
1991
Oct.
1995
Dec.
1999
Apr.
2002
Nov.
Mean
3 Months Prior to Elections -0.90 -0.92 -7.65 -0.818 -0.961 -2.24
2 Months Prior to Elections 16.15 4.534 -0.478 0.352 9.615 6.03
1 Month Prior to Elections -0.47 2.580 6.7 2.107 -0.056 2.172
Election Month 1.009 -0.488 2.027 -0.715 -1.662 0.0342
1 Month After Elections 1.147 -0.265 -0.857 1.987 0.503
2 Months After Election -0.357 4.567 0.052 0.627 1.22
3 Months After Elections -0.651 -0.865 1.157 -0.543 -0.225
The pre-election period of the 1991 election indicates that one-month and two-months
prior to the election saw high growth rates for domestic credits.  At the same time it
declined in the election month and the following months.  In the 1995 elections, the
election month and one-month prior to elections demonstrated significant increases in
the growth rate of the monthly domestic credits.  However, in the case of the 1999
elections, one-month prior and after the elections the growth rate was significantly
higher.  Two-months prior to elections in the case of 2002 elections demonstrated
significant increases in the growth of domestic credit.  The analysis, thus, indicates some
support but not overall systematic support for the opportunistic cycles.
7.3. Inflation
Inflation is another macroeconomic variable, of which trend can be determined by
political manipulation during election periods.  Figure 6 depicts the inflation rates
produced from the GDP deflator, which illustrates that all elections, except for the 1995
election, took place when the inflation rate was either at the lowest or close to the lowest
rate.  It is also interesting to see that after each election, except for the 1995 election,
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inflation increased in the post-election period.  This provides direct evidence for
opportunistic cycles, which are particularly visible in the shape of the figure as well: an
election is followed by an increase in the inflation rate, and then approaching election
year and hence the decline in the inflation rate.
Figure 6. Annual Inflation Rate
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As evidenced by figure 6 and table 7, the 1973, 1977 and 1987 elections took place in the
increasing trends of inflation.  However, inflation rates in these years were still lower
than the following year, or the growth rate in relation to the previous year is very low.
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Annual Inflation Rate in Election Years
Election
Years
Mean
Inflation- Pre-
Election Years
Inflation Rate-
One year before
the Election
Inflation Rate
in the Election
Year
Inflation Rate-
One Year after
the Election
1973 25.65 20.3 27.06 34.72
1977 29.62 25.64 27.65 48.52
1983 58.2 32.27 31.3 59.1
1987 54.45 44.79 47 72.2
1991 74.31 72.40 59.72 73.9
1995 83.2 94.65 102.5 90.68
1999 89.66 82.07 46.27 60.9
2002 55.74 50.56 46.7
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As table 7 depicts, the 1983, 1991, 1999 and 2002 elections took place in the lower
inflation years in comparison to previous years.  An important common point in the
inflation trend is that the inflation rate demonstrates increases throughout the post-
election year.  This vindicates the statement made above that the consequence of
suppressed prices in the election year is reflected in the relatively higher inflation rate the
following year.
To further investigate the possible opportunistic cycles in inflation years, monthly data
were utilised from the Consumer Price Index, the result is depicted in table 8, according
to which in the election months of 1987, 1991 and 1999, inflation rates were higher than
previous months or the other two pre-election months.  However, in the case of the
1995 and 2002 elections, the inflation rate in the election month was lower than the pre-
election months with the exception of the three months pre-election period for the 2002
election.  Increasing inflation in the following month of the election in 1987 and 1995
elections can also be gathered from table 8.
Table 8. Monthly Inflation Rates in Election Periods
Elections
1987
Nov.
1991
Oct.
1995
Dec.
1999
Apr.
2002
Nov.
Mean
3 Months Prior to Elections 0.034 0.013 0.079 0.043 0.020 0.0378
2 Months Prior to Elections 0.017 0.039 0.077 0.029 0.0366 0.039
1 Month Prior to Elections 0.048 0.06 0.055 0.038 0.0367 0.047
Election Month 0.063 0.065 0.035 0.051 0.03 0.048
1 Month After Elections 0.07 0.052 0.077 0.030 0.016 0.049
2 Months After Election 0.161 0.043 0.04 0.031 0.021 0.059
3 Months After Elections 0.037 0.09 0.05 0.0341 0.02 0.046
Mean Monthly Inflation Rate 0.028 0.045 0.049 0.043 0.021
It is important to add that election month inflation rates were higher than the mean
monthly inflation rate in the 1987, 1991, 1999 and 2002 elections.  Post-election 3
months inflation rate is higher than the election month inflation rate in the case of 1991,
1999 and 2002 elections.  Consequently, monthly data do not provide systematic
statistical support but provide evidence and verification for particular elections.  When
the mean value of election month is compared to pre-election month mean values, it is
obvious that election month mean is higher than all pre-election month mean values.
Mean value of election month inflation rate throughout the election year is lower than
the post-one and two months inflation mean values.
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Figure 7. Monthly Inflation Rates
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Depicting monthly inflation rates in figure 7 demonstrates non-systematic support for
opportunistic cycles.  Particularly the 1995 and 2002 elections took place in the declining
inflation trend prior to election.  It should be added that the increase in the inflation rate
in the election month in comparison to the previous months was very low during the
1991 and 1999 elections.  An important conclusion is that elections took place in the
months away from peak inflation rates.
VIII. POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF MONETARY POLICY
INSTRUMENTS AND OUTCOMES IN TURKEY: ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS
In the light of the econometric analysis modelling and specifications presented in the
earlier section, this section aims to present the results of the defined autoregressive
regression estimates.
In the regression analyses, the following electoral variables were incorporated which were
described previously: ED1(b2), is the pre-election month(s) dummy variable; ED (b3)
stands for election month(s) dummy variable; and ED2(b4) denotes the post-election
month(s) dummy variable.  The numbers of the months in the electoral variables are
determined by goodness of fit test among 12 monthly models estimated for each policy
instrument.  It should also be reiterated that 6 of these models are for the pre-election
period and the remaining are estimated for the post-election period.
8.1. Monetary Variable, M1, and the PMC
This section aims to present the results of the econometric analysis of M1, which was
carried out in light of the specifications mentioned above.  As mentioned, in finding the
best fit or benchmark model, the model which yielded the highest R2 is selected as the
best fit.  As mentioned above, the model for M1 has ARMA(3,3) structure.  In addition,
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the tests indicate that for finding the intervention impact of the elections on M1, the
model, which consists of the two-month pre-election and six month post-election, has
the best structure.  However, for investigating the impact of elections on inflation, the
model which covers the four month pre- and post-election periods with ARMA(1,1)
structure is the best fit.  As a result, the ARMA models of macroeconomic time series
variables were included in the regression equation.  Due to the heteroscedasticity,
GARCH terms are also included into equation.
It might be useful to recall the related hypotheses, which are tested in this section: H1
(Money supply, M1t, increases prior to elections) and H2 (Money supply, M1t, decreases
after elections)
The election dummy variables devised according to regression model expressed in
equation 3 (
  
€ 
Yt = b0 + Σ
i=1
4
bt Xit + et ).  The regression analysis was performed to investigate
the impact of elections on monetary variable, M1.  The regression results are depicted in
table 9, which indicate that all the electoral variables are significant at 10%.
Table 9. M1 and Elections, 1986M1-2002M11 (Dependent variable: M1)
Notes: a: 1% level of significance; b: 10% level
Independent Variables Coefficients t-statistics
Constant 0.9634 1.072
T (b1) -0.0065 -2.989
a
ED1 (b2) 0.4798 1.684
b
ED (b3) 0.7565 -1.833
b
ED2 (b4) -0.3298 -1.726
b
AR(1) 0.280 3.287a
AR(2) 0.171 2.854a
AR(3) 0.474 5.876a
MA(1) -0.192 -3.675a
MA(2) 0.021 0.438
MA(3) 0.650 8.976a
ARCH(0) 0.087 1.912b
ARCH(1) 0.056 3.345a
GARCH(1) 0.899 36.567a
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The results produced in this section confirm the earlier conclusions reached by Asutay
(2004) as regards to M1, and it establishes that election quarter and the pre-electoral
quarter together with three quarter post-election period were significant.  In concluding,
analysis in this section provides sufficient evidence to accept the related hypotheses,
namely H1 and H2.  Thus, incumbent governments use money supply to manufacture
PMC to enhance their popularity for electoral reasons.
8.2. Inflation, I, and the PMC
The model specification for investigating the PBC or PMC through the inflation rate or
the consumer price index in described above in detail.  It should be noted that the best-
fit model selected among the monthly models covers four pre-and-post election months.
Model expressed in equation 3 (
  
€ 
Yt = b0 + Σ
i=1
4
bt Xit + et ) was used to incorporate the
electoral dummy variables for regression analysis in examining the impact of elections on
inflation in the form of intervention or interrupted time series analysis.  The regression
results are depicted in table 10.
Table 10. Inflation and Elections, 1981M1-2002M11
Dependent variable: I (Inflation)
Notes: a: 1% level of significance; b: 10% level of significance
As the results reported in table 10 depict, inflation decreases by 0.069% during four
month prior to elections, and also decreases by 0.083% in the four months succeeding
the election month.  However, the analysis in this section demonstrates that elections do
Independent
Variables
Coefficients t-statistics
Constant 0.087 3.674a
T (b1) 0.00095 3.216
a
ED1 (b2) -0.069 -1.104
ED (b3) 0.176 -0.9567
ED2 (b4) -0.083 -1.698
b
AR(1) 0.478 4.765a
ARCH(0) 0.005 1.689b
ARCH(1) 0.216 3.125a
GARCH(1) 0.745 20.981a
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not particularly lead to inflation, as the pre-and-post election variables, ED1(b2) and
ED2(b4) respectively, are not statistically significant.
As a result, hypotheses that inflation increases prior to elections (H5) and decreases after
(H6) have to be rejected.  In other words, the evidence is not sufficiently strong to accept
the relationship between elections and inflation.  This result coincides with the
conclusions reached on an earlier study by Asutay (2004).  Although analysis in Asutay
(2004) managed to find that governments do manipulate inflation rates in the election
quarter, the impact of elections on inflation was found to be weak.
As a consequence, hypotheses H7 and H8 which respectively state that inflation, It, is
determined by government policy, Gt, during an election period and inflation, It, is
determined by changes in demand condition in the private sector, Pt, during an election
period have to be eliminated from the analysis.  Because these two latter hypotheses are
conditioned to a significant relationship between elections and inflation, which has been
rejected in line with the results as depicted in table 10.
It should be noted that it is normal that the inflation does not increase in the pre-election
period as prices increase in SEEs-oriented goods and services are deferred to the post-
election period.  Thus, this reasoning should be used to justify the results produced in
this section as well, albeit it may not be consistent with the general theoretic.  The
important issue however is to highlight the particularities of each case, and hence
inflation may follow such a pattern in relation to elections in the case of Turkey.
8.3. Monetary Instrument (M1), Government Finance and Private Credit
This section aims to investigate the impact of elections on monetary instrument, M1,
through government budget deficits/surplus and private credits.  This resembles the
interacted or fiscal policy adjusted monetary variable analysis presented in an earlier study
(Asutay, 2004).  The rationale in this section, as described previously, stems from the fact
that when the government is involved in the political manipulation of the economy, it
has to find monetary resources to meet the additional money demands created from
expansionary policies.  At the same time elections are believed to necessitate additional
increases in the money supply due to the election campaigns.
This section thus attempts to test H3 (money supply, M1t, is determined by government
policy, GFt during the election period) and H4 (money supply, M1t, is determined by
fluctuations and cycles in the demand of private sector, PCt, during the election period)
in light of the empirical specifications described above.  In so doing, the section
estimates the equation 4 (  
€ 
DYt = c0 + c1DGt + c2DPt + et ), which has already been defined
above.  The results of the analysis are depicted in table 11.
As mentioned previously, the estimated regression results in table 11 are the result of the
ARMA(1,1) and ARCH(0) and ARCH(1) structures, and hence were included in the
regression equation.
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The results demonstrate that the independent variables are significant at 1%.  The
magnitude of PC (c2) is rather low despite having the expected (+) sign.  According to
the result, a 1% increase in M1 is associated with 0.0027% increase in the aggregate
private credit.  Therefore, H 4 which hypothesises that money supply of M1 is
determined by fluctuations and cycles in the demand of private sector during election
period is accepted, but caution is taken due to the very low coefficient.
Table 11. Money Supply, Governmental Finance
and Aggregate Private Credit, 1986M1-2002M11
(Dependent variable: M1-Monetary Variable)
Notes: a: 1% level of significance;
GF: Government Finance; PC: Private Credit
The GF (c2) or government finance is statistically highly significant and has the expected
sign, as the hypothesis implies a M1 increase and an expansionary fiscal policy prior to
elections and contractionary fiscal policy and, hence, declined M1 in the post electoral
period.  The magnitude of GF demonstrates the very high impact of fiscal policy on M1,
as the coefficient of the GF implies that a 1% increase in M1 in the pre-election months
is explained by a 2.078% increase in fiscal deficits due to election oriented government
expenditure.  Thus, hypothesis H3, which presumes that money supply is determined by
government policy during the election period, is accepted.
IX. CONCLUSION
This study, similar to the earlier one (Asutay, 2004), aimed at modelling the political
manipulation of monetary policy instruments by the incumbent governments to enhance
their popularity for the coming elections and ensure their re-election.  In short, attempts
were made to model PBC/PMC in Turkey.
In the statistical descriptive section, annual and monthly data were utilised for inference
and through figures for visual understanding.  Depending on the nature and extent of the
Independent Variables Coefficients t-statistics
CONS 0.0098 0.345
GF (c1) -2.078 -19.8634
a
PC (c2) 0.0027 13.145
a
AR(1) -0.362 -9.867a
MA(1) 0.0038 0.268
ARCH(0) 0.0362 8.321a
ARCH(1) 2.9875 5.289a
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available data various data sets utilised in descriptively and visually searching for PBC in
Turkey.
The statistical analysis on the monetary policy instruments provides certain evidence and
support in favour of PMC in Turkey.  For instance, the annual growth of money in
circulation provides support for the use of monetary policy in the case of the 1987, 1999
and 2002 elections.  In the case of monthly data, there is reasonable support for the
monetary political cycles in 1987, 1999 and 2002 elections.  In particular, the 1999
elections obviously demonstrate the presence of opportunistic cycles. In the case of
domestic credits, annual data provides evidence of political manipulation in the case of
the 1987 and 1991 elections and a close but not certain implication of manipulations in
the 1995 elections.  In the monthly data, domestic credits growth rate demonstrate that
in the 1987, 1999, 1995 and 2002 elections there was political manipulations.
Statistical analysis performed reasonably well in the case of annual inflation rates, as it
demonstrates that except for the 1995 elections, all elections took place in a low inflation
year.  This may contradict the theory, but, as explained earlier, in Turkey people are more
sensitive to price increases than to unemployment. With regards monthly inflation rates,
the analysis provided evidence for opportunistic PBC in inflation rates in the 1987, 1991,
1999 and 2002 elections.  Thus, descriptive statistical analysis renders some evidence in
the case of inflation for opportunistic business cycles.
In sum, statistical analysis provides general evidence for certain election years or months
according to each policy variable and indicates for the manipulation of monetary policy
and their instruments.  Although descriptive studies may be negated as unsystematic, it
provides an understanding and a base according to which one can develop a systematic
econometric analysis.
The econometric analysis, in the later section, is based on monthly data from the Central
Bank of Turkey for the period January 1986 to November 2002.  The data were treated
for its time-series futures.  Interrupted time series model was used as an empirical
framework.  For each dependent variable or the policy instrument autoregressive
benchmark model was selected by basing on best-fit tests.
The M1 model, in the econometric model, performed well, as the elections variables are
significant and indicates that M1 increases in one month prior to election and decreases
in the six month proceeding the election.  Hence, related hypotheses indicating the
presence of PBC or PMC are accepted. By basing on the provided evidence it can be
concluded that incumbent governments commence to manipulate monetary supply for
their private political gains two months prior to elections.  The political monetary cycle is
completed six months after the election, when the governments’ contraction policies set
in.
In the case of inflation, the model could not yield the same kind of strong evidence.  The
best-fit model in the case of inflation tried to capture the election impact in the four-
month pre-and-post election periods.  However, the results have been inconclusive.  It
should be added that due to the particular features of Turkey and the impact of the
government on price setting through SEEs, the results, as mentioned before, should be
accepted.
In continuing to find further evidence for the existence of PMC in Turkey, the monetary
policy interacted with fiscal policy and private sector credits.  The analysis provided weak
but significant support for the impact of an election on M1 through private sector
credits, but the impact of elections through government finance on M1 was found to be
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strongly significant. This directly interlinks fiscal policy manipulation to the changes
taking place in M1 and hence indicates that elections stand for an intervention in the
development of M1.  This, therefore, requires the acceptance of the related hypotheses
that M1 is determined by electioneering policies of the incumbent governments and the
demands of the private sector during the election period respectively.
The econometric results, thus, provide unequivocal evidence for the existence of
opportunistic type of politically manufactured policy cycles, or PBC or PMC, in Turkey
during the 1986-2002.  It is important to note that these results are based on pre-2003
period, which implies that the Central Bank did not have autonomy or independence
and, as a result, accommodated the demands of the government by meeting its additional
requirements during election periods. In addition, it provides support for the Nordhaus
type of opportunistic PBC through monetary policy instruments and substantiates the
earlier strong evidence produced by Asutay (2004), where the impact of elections on
fiscal and monetary policy instruments in opportunistic political business cycle model
was modelled.
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